Introduction
Bob, who share two-particle systems emitted by the same source. We specify the state of a coupled system by λ. We denote Alice's parameter by a that can be set either at S 1 or at S 2 and denote Bob's parameter by b that can be set either at S ′ 1 or at S ′ 2 . In a run, Alice sets her apparatus either at S 1 or at S 2 and, in either case, on receiving her particle she makes a measurement, the outcome of which is π A that is either +1 or −1. In the same run, Bob sets his apparatus either at S ′ 1 or at S ′ 2 and, in either case, on receiving his particle he makes a measurement, the outcome of which is π B that can be either +1 or −1. Alice and Bob record the outcomes of their measurements for many runs as they receive two-particle systems emitted from the same source.
We denote the probability that Alice obtains the outcome π A = +1 or −1 by Pr(λ; π A , a) and, similarly, we denote the probability that Bob obtains the outcome π B = +1 or −1 by Pr(λ; π B ; b). Also, we denote the probability that Alice and Bob obtain the outcomes π A and π B , respectively, by Pr(λ; π A , π B ; a, b). These outcomes result from their choices of the parameters a and b, i.e. which one of the four pairs (S 1 , S According to quantum theory, the outcomes π A and π B both are completely random and Alice and Bob can only find the probabilities to obtain +1 or −1 at the outcomes of their measurements. As it is described in the Section 4, Alice's and Bob's parameters a and b decide these probabilities.
In many runs, Alice can choose between S 1 or S 2 with some probability. Similarly, in many runs, Bob can choose between S ′ 1 or S ′ 2 with some probability. Assume that the source emits a total of N two-particle systems. We denote by N (π A ; a) the number of times Alice gets the outcome π A when she may set her parameter a either at S 1 or at S 2 . Similarly, we denote by N (π B ; b) the number of times Bob gets the outcome π B when he may set his parameter b either at S 
For many runs we consider an ensemble of states emitted from the source that may not be the same. To allow mixture of states we denote the normalized probability density, characterizing the ensemble of emissions, by ρ(λ). The ensemble probabilities are
where Γ is the space of states λ. Now, factorizability states that
That is, for each λ the joint probabilities are arithmetic product of their respective marginals. Factorizability being the most important technical ingredient in the proof of Bell inequality can be seen as follows. Following inequalities must hold when probabilities are sensible quantities
where all K, L, M, N are real numbers. Players can go for one of the two available strategies: X 1 , X 2 for Alice and X ′ 1 , X ′ 2 for Bob. As factorizability is central to obtain Bell inequality, in this paper we construct quantum games from non-factorizable probabilities that exploit EPR setup. This rests on Fine's view [21] that the violation of Bell inequality in EPR experiments shows that quantum theory violates factorizability. This view allows us to construct quantum games for which factorizability always corresponds to the classical game.
We recognize key features of an EPR setup being that these relate to a probabilistic system divided into two parts such that a) each observer has access to one part of the system b) each observer can select between two available choices c) observers cannot communicate between themselves d) observers can make independent selections between the available choices e) probabilities relevant to each part of the system are normalized 1 and that f) probabilities are sensible quantities. It is worth mentioning here that the experimental testing of Bell inequality involves four correlation experiments that correspond to combining S 1 with S ′ 1 , S 1 with S ′ 2 , S 2 with S ′ 1 , and S 2 with S ′ 2 , respectively. These experiments are mutually exclusive in the sense that for any given experiment Alice has to select between S 1 and S 2 and Bob has to select between S ′ 1 and S ′ 2 . That is, Alice (Bob) cannot go for S 1 (S ′ 1 ) and S 2 (S ′ 2 ) simultaneously because the corresponding observables are incompatible, and cannot be measured simultaneously. Whereas, in the above derivation of the Bell inequality it is assumed that S 1 , S ′ 1 , S 2 , S ′ 2 all have definite values which can be measured simultaneously in pairs.
Games with coins
The above mentioned features are remindful of coins which, if distributed between players, are found to have all the above mentioned properties. For coins factorizability has a straightforward meaning in that the associated probabilities remain factorizable. Hence, we develop an analysis of two-player games with non-factorizable probabilities by first translating playing of three well known games in terms of the games played when players share coins. It turns out that a version of this translation provides the right comparison with the probabilities involved in the EPR experiments and opens the way to the next step i.e. to introduce non-factorizable probabilities into the playing of two-player games.
Two-coin setup
We now consider pairs of coins and use it to play a two-player game (9) . For example, this game can be played when each player receives a coin, head up, and 'to flip' or to 'not to flip' is a player's strategy. Both coins are then passed to a referee who rewards the players after observing the state of both coins.
Assume S 1 (to flip) and S 2 (not to flip) are Alice's strategies and S ′ 1 (to flip) and S ′ 2 (not to flip) are Bob's strategies. That is, with reference to the matrices (9), we make the association
In two-coin setup, we assume that the strategies S 1 and S ′ 1 represent Alice's and Bob's actions 'to flip' the coin, respectively; and, similarly, S 2 and S ′ 2 represent Alice's and Bob's actions 'not to flip' the coin, respectively.
In repeated runs of the game players can play mixed strategies. Alice's mixed strategy x ∈ [0, 1] is the probability to choose S 1 over S 2 and similarly Bob's mixed strategy y ∈ [0, 1] is the probability to choose S ′ 1 over S ′ 2 . Players' payoffs are written as
where T is for transpose and the subscripts A and B refer to Alice and Bob, respectively. The first and the second entries in a parentheses are Alice's and Bob's payoffs, respectively. Assume (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) [12] :
In rest of this paper we will use "NE" when we refer to either a Nash equilibrium or to Nash equilibria, assuming that the right meaning can be judged from the context. We identify this arrangement to play a two-player game using two coins as the two-coin setup.
Four-coin setup
The game (9) can also be played using four coins instead of two. It is arranged by assigning two coins to each player before the game is played. In a run each player has to choose one coin. Two coins out of four are, therefore, chosen by the players in each turn. These coins are then passed to a referee who tosses them together and observes the outcome. It is assumed that the players do not need to share fair coins. We recall that in two-coin setup S 1 and S ′ 1 are Alice's and Bob's strategies, respectively, that represent players' actions 'to flip' the coin that a player receives in a turn. Instead of flipping or not flipping, in four-coin setup a player's strategy is to choose one out of the two coins that are made available to each player in a turn. The four-coin setup is relevant as, in a run, choosing a coin out of the two corresponds to choosing one of the two directions in which measurement is performed in standard EPR experiment, the outcome of which is +1 or −1.
In repeated game, a player's strategy is defined by the selection she/he makes over several runs of the game. For example, a player plays a pure strategy when she/he goes for the same coin over all the runs and plays a mixed strategy when she/he finds a probability to choose one coin out of the two over many runs. Referee rewards the players according to their strategies, the underlying statistics of four coins obtained from the outcomes of many tosses each one of which follows every time the two players choose two out of the total four coins, and the matrices (9) representing the game being played.
We identify the arrangement using four coins to play a two-player game as the four-coin setup. Note that in four-coin setup the players' rewards depend on the outcomes of repeated tosses even for pure strategies. A large number of runs are, therefore, necessary whether a player plays a pure-strategy or a mixed-strategy. Four-coin setup provides an inherently probabilistic character to playing a two-player game and facilitates a probabilistic analysis when we seek to play the game (9) using EPR experiments.
As the four-coin setup uses a different definition of a strategy relative to the two-coin setup, we call S 1 and S 2 being Alice's coins and S ′ 1 and S ′ 2 being Bob's coins. When selecting a coin is a player's strategy and we want to play the game given by the matrices (9), it is reasonable to make the association S 1 ∼ X 1 , S 2 ∼ X 2 , and S
We represent the head of a coin by +1 and its tail by −1 and adapt this convention in the rest of this paper. For coins, Alice's outcome of π A = +1 or −1 (whether she goes for S 1 or S 2 ) is independent from Bob's outcome of π B = +1 or −1 (whether he goes for S ′ 1 or S ′ 2 ) and relevant joint probabilities are factorizable.
Referring to the definition (3) of factorizability and noticing that probabilities associated to coins are factorizable, we use the same notation that is introduced in Section 2 to consider, for example, the probability Pr(π A , π B ; S 1 , S ′ 1 ) that can be factorized as Pr(π A ; S 1 ) Pr(π B ; S ′ 1 ). We define probabilities r, r ′ ∈ [0, 1] by r = Pr(+1; S 1 ) and r ′ = Pr(+1; S ′ 1 ) saying that r is the probability of getting head for Alice's first coin S 1 and r ′ is the probability of getting head for Bob's first coin S ′ 1 . Factorizability then allows us to write Pr(+1, −1;
where s = Pr(+1; S 2 ) and s ′ = Pr(+1; S ′ 2 ) i.e. s and s ′ are the probabilities of getting head for Alice's and Bob's second coin, respectively.
In four-coin setup we find it useful to have the following table:
Alice Bob
from which we define payoff relations for the players:
For example, Π A (S 1 , S ′ 2 ) is Alice's payoff when, in repeated runs of coin tossing, she always goes for her first coin, i.e. S 1 , while Bob goes for his second coin, i.e. S As it is the case with two-coin setup, Alice's mixed strategy in four-coin setup is the probability with which she chooses her pure strategy 2 S 1 over her other pure strategy S 2 during repeated runs of the experiment. Similarly, Bob's mixed strategy is the probability with which he chooses his pure strategy S ′ 1 over his other pure strategy S ′ 2 during repeated runs of the experiment. Assume that Alice plays S 1 with probability x and Bob plays S ′ 1 with probability y, their mixed-strategy payoff relations are
The NE can then be found from (11) , which is written as
In the following, before we make a transition to playing our game using EPR experiments, we consider playing three well known games using both the two-and the four-coin setups.
Examples
We analyze the games of PD, SH, and Chicken in two-and four-coin setups and afterwards make a transition to the EPR setup. PD is known to be a representative of the problems of social cooperation [12] and has been one of the earliest [2] and favorite topics for quantum games.
Hence it is worthwhile to analyze this game in the setup using non-factorizable probabilities. Our second game is SH that, like PD, describes conflict between safety and social cooperation. Our third game is Chicken, also known as the Hawk-Dove game [12] , which is considered an influential model of conflict for two players in game theory.
Prisoner's Dilemma
PD is a noncooperative game [12] that is widely known to economists, social and political scientists, and in recent years to quantum physicists. It is one of the earliest games to be investigated in the quantum regime [2] . Its name comes from the following situation: two criminals are arrested after having committed a crime together. Each suspect is placed in a separate cell and may choose between two strategies: to confess Referring to the matrices (9) we make the association X 1 , X
and (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) = (0, 0) comes out as a unique NE at which players' payoffs are Π A (S 1 , S
In the four-coin setup, the PD game as defined above is played as follows. Using the mixedstrategy payoff relation (15) , the pair of pure strategies (S 2 , S ′ 2 ) is represented by (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) = (0, 0). If we require this strategy pair to be a NE then we also need to know about the constraints this requirement imposes on r, s, r ′ , s ′ . When (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) = (0, 0) the NE inequalities (16) for PD are reduced to
Now, for the NE inequalities (18) to hold, it is required that (s − r) ≤ 0 and (s ′ − r ′ ) ≤ 0 both when △ 1 /△ 2 ≥ 1 and when △ 1 /△ 2 < 1. This, of course, is possible if
which must hold if the strategy pair (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) = (0, 0) is to be a NE in PD. Eqs. (19) should be true along with that the probabilities Pr(π A , π B ; a, b) are factorizable. As we find it, this result provides the basis on which the forthcoming argument for the quantum version of this game rests. Notice that, from (13), we obtain Π A (S 2 , S 
However, it is found that this freedom does not affect the forthcoming argument for a quantum game.
Stag Hunt
Along with PD, the game of SH provides another interesting context to study problems of social cooperation. It describes the situation when two hunters can either jointly hunt a stag (an adult deer that makes a large meal) or individually hunt a rabbit (which is tasty but makes substantially small meal). Hunting a stag is quite challenging and hunters need to cooperate with each other, especially, it is quite unlikely that a hunter hunts a stag alone. It is found that, in contrast to PD that has a single pure NE, the game of SH has three NE, two of which are pure and one is mixed. The two pure NE correspond to the situations when both hunters hunt the stag as a team and when each hunts rabbit by himself. SH differs from PD in that mutual cooperation gives maximum reward to the hunters. When compared to PD, SH is considered a better model for the problems of (social) cooperation.
Referring to the matrices (9) the game of SH is defined by
In two-coin setup the NE inequalities for this game remain the same as the inequalities (17) except that now we have
Now we play this game using the four-coin setup. The NE inequalities come out to be the same as the ones given in (25) except that now we have △ 3 = −(α + β) and △ 2 = −α. Then for (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) 1 = (1, 0) we require r = 0 and s
Similarly, for (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) 3 = (0, 1) we require r ′ = 0 and s = 0.
At (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) 2 = (α/(α + β), α/(α + β)) the inequalities (25) reduce to
which puts constraint on r, s, r ′ , s ′ given as
A special case is the one when α = β and the strategy pair (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) = (1/2, 1/2) becomes a NE which imposes certain constraints on r, s, r ′ , s ′ . For this NE the inequalities (16) , for the game defined by (9, 29) , are reduced to
so, we require
if the strategy pair (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) = (1/2, 1/2) is to be a NE in this game. Along with this, the probabilities Pr(π A , π B ; a, b) are to be factorizable.
Playing games with EPR experiments
Section 3 describes playing a two-player game with four coins such that choosing a coin is a strategy while players' payoffs are given by their strategies, the matrix of the game, and the underlying statistics of the coins. This facilitates transition to playing the same game using EPR experiments.
In EPR setup, Alice and Bob are spatially separated and are unable to communicate with each other. In an individual run, both receive one half of a pair of particles originating from a common source. In the same run of the experiment both choose one from two given (pure) strategies. These strategies are the two directions in space along which spin or polarization measurements can be made.
Keeping the notation for the coins, we denote these directions to be S 1 , S 2 for Alice and
for Bob. Each measurement generates +1 or −1 as the outcome, like it is the case with coins after their toss in the four-coin setup. Experimental results are recorded for a large number of individual runs of the experiment and payoffs are awarded depending on the directions the players go for over many runs (defining their strategies), the matrix of the game they play, and the statistics of the measurement outcomes.
For EPR experiments, we retain Cereceda' notation [26] for the associated probabilities:
In this notation, for example, we write p 1 for the probability Pr(+1, +1; S 1 , S ′ 1 ) and p 8 for the probability Pr(−1, −1; S 1 , S ′ 2 ). One can then construct the following table of probabilities Alice
This table allows to transparently see how the probabilities p i (1 ≤ i ≤ 16) are linked to the probabilities Pr(π A , π B ; a, b), where we recall that a can be set at S 1 or at S 2 and, similarly, b can be set at S 2 or at S
Notice that the factorizable probabilities (12) are also normalized and (41) holds for them. Payoff relations (13) are originally constructed when the game given by the matrices (9) is played with four coins and their mathematical form convinces one to use the following recipe [24] to reward players when the same game is played using EPR probabilities (40): When p i are factorizable in terms of r, r ′ , s, s ′ , a comparison of (42) with (13) requires
That is, the factorizability of p i in terms r, r ′ , s, s ′ makes the game played by EPR probabilities equivalent to the one played by using coins.
However, the EPR probabilities p i , appearing in (13), may not be factorizable in terms of r, s, r ′ , s ′ , whereas for both the payoff relations (13, 42) the normalization (41) continues to hold.
5 Two-player games using non-factorizable probabilities
As it is the case with the coin game, Alice's mixed strategy is defined to be the probability to choose between S 1 and S 2 and we can use, once again, the payoff relations (15) which, however, now correspond to the possible situation when p i may not be factorizable. So that, the relations (13) can be replaced with the relations (42) in Alice's mixed-strategy payoff relation in (15) . The same applies to Bob's payoff relations. Note that when p i are factorizable, using (43) allows the probabilities r, r ′ , s, s ′ to be expressed in terms of p i :
which are useful relations for the forthcoming argument for a quantum game. Along with the normalization (41), the EPR probabilities p i (1 ≤ i ≤ 16) also satisfy certain other constraints imposed by the requirements of causality. Cereceda [26] writes these constraints as
which is referred to as the causal communication constraint [26] . Notice that the constraints (45), of course, also hold when p i are factorizable and are written in terms of r, s, r ′ , s ′ as in (43). Essentially, these constraints state that, on measurement, Alice's probability of obtaining particular outcome (+1 or −1), when she goes for S 1 or S 2 , is independent of how Bob sets up his apparatus (i.e. along S ′ 1 or along S ′ 2 ). The same applies to Bob i.e. on measurement his probability of obtaining a particular outcome (+1 or −1), when he goes for S ′ 1 or S ′ 2 , is independent of how Alice sets up her apparatus (i.e. along S 1 or along S 2 ). Other authors may like to call the constraints (45) with some different name, for example, Winsberg and Fine [22] have described them as the locality constraint.
Notice that because of normalization (41) half of the Eqs. (45) are redundant that makes eight among sixteen probabilities p i to be independent. A convenient solution [26] of the system (41, 45), for which the set of variables:
is expressed in terms of the remaining set of variables:
is given as follows
The relationships (48) between joint probabilities arise because both the normalization condition (41) and the causal communication constraint (45) are fulfilled. From Eqs. (48) one can obtain other constraints considering that the sum of any combination of probabilities from the set υ must be non-negative. In the following are some results to be used later in this paper. In (48) the sum p 2 + p 7 is non-negative and it requires that
In (48) the sum p 3 + p 10 is non-negative and it requires that
Similarly, the sum p 6 + p 13 is non-negative and it requires that
proposed in this paper uses EPR experiments to play a two-player game and a quantum game is associated to a classical game such that it becomes hard to construct an Enk and Pike-type argument as both the payoff relations and the players' sets of strategies remain identical [28] in the classical and the associated quantum game. In the present setup it is non-factorizability -responsible for the violation of Bell inequality in EPR experiments -that gives rise to the new solutions in quantum game. When players play a game using a physical system for which joint probabilities are factorizable the classical game results always. In other words, the role of non-factorizable probabilities is sought in the gametheoretic solution concept of a NE, when the physical realization for these probabilities is provided by the EPR experiments. This analysis introduces a new viewpoint in the area of quantum games in which non-factorizability gets translated into the language of game theory.
The argument put forward in this paper can be described as follows. Firstly, players' payoffs are re-expressed in the form Π A,B (p i , x, y, A, B) where p i are the sixteen joint probabilities; x, y are players strategies, and A, B are players' payoff matrices defined in (9) . Secondly, Nash inequalities are used to impose constraints on p i that ensure that with factorizable p i the game has classical outcome and the resulting payoffs can be interpreted in terms of classical mixed-strategy game. It is achieved by playing the game in the four-coin setup and using Nash inequalities to obtain constraints on the coin probabilities r, s, r ′ , s ′ which reproduce the outcome of the classical mixedstrategy game. Using (44), which results from factorizability, these constraints on r, s, r ′ , s ′ are then translated in terms of constraints on p i . Thirdly, while referring to the EPR setup, p i are allowed to be non-factorizable when the constraints on p i continue to hold. Fourthly, and lastly, it is observed how non-factorizability leads to the emergence of new solutions of the game.
Note that for a game different sets of constraints are defined depending on which NE is to be the solution of the game. For example, for three NE in Chicken we require three different sets of constraints on r, s, r ′ , s ′ . Considering one of these three sets at a time we repeat the four steps stated above. The same procedure is then repeated for other sets of constraints corresponding to other NE.
That is, in this setup not all solutions of a game are re-expressed in terms of a single set of constraints on r, s, r ′ , s ′ . Instead, a separate set of constraints is found for each NE. It seems that the four-coin setup is the minimal arrangement that allows one to introduce, in a smooth way, the EPR probabilities into a game-like setting. We suggest that with increasing the number of coins, shared by each of the two players, all the NE of a game can be translated to a single constraint on the underlying coin probabilities which are subsequently translated in terms of p i . This will then allow to see the role of non-factorizability on solution of a game from a single set of constraints. However, this will be obtained at a price: Firstly, more coins will be involved resulting in more mathematical complexity; secondly, for more coins player's strategy will need to be redefined such that it permits to incorporate EPR probabilities.
Note that the usual approach uses entangled states to construct quantum games and this paper uses non-factorizability to the same end. Mathematically, non-factorizability comes out to be a stronger condition than the condition that translates entanglement into constraints on joint probabilities. That is, a non-factorizable set of probabilities always corresponds to some entangled state but an entangled state can produce a factorizable set of probabilities. For example, in case of singlet state the outcomes of two measurements violate Bell inequality only along certain directions, and not along other directions. In other words, in a quantum game exploiting entangled states, the joint probabilities may still be factorizable but for a quantum game, resulting from non-factorizable probabilities, Bell inequality is bound to be violated. Non-factorizability being a stronger condition may well be suggested as the reason why it cannot be helpful to escape from the classical outcome in PD.
The proposed setup demonstrates how non-factorizability can change outcome of a game. We suggest to extend [29] this setup to analyze multi-player quantum games [3] where players share physical systems for which joint probabilities cannot be factorized.
